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Has Ethno-Racial Segregation Increased
in the Greater Paris Metropolitan Area?*
ABSTRACT
Changes in the intensity of ethno-racial segregation in the greater Paris metropolitan area
over the last three census periods are analyzed. First, immigrants strictly speaking (persons
who themselves immigrated) were studied in terms of national origin; to this group were
added all second-generation immigrants that could be identified by means of census infor-
mation. Scale used is neighborhoods and municipalities in the greater Paris metropolitan
area. Dissimilarity and isolation indices as well as concentrations by commune (municipal-
ity) show that the most intensely segregated immigrants are from North Africa, sub-Saharan
Africa and Turkey, that segregation is increasing at a moderate rate, and that it is signifi-
cantly more pronounced than socio-economic segregation while remaining well below racial
segregation levels observed for United States cities. The vast majority of immigrants studied
live in neighborhoods where they represent a minority, meaning they are living in residen-
tially mixed situations, not ghettos.
Since the Chicago School, urban segregation has been a classic theme of
sociological research. In France it has been handled primarily in terms of
social segregation—segregation of social classes, socio-economic or socio-
occupational categories. France thus contrasts on this point with the United
States, where most research has focused on ethno-racial segregation,
primarily between Blacks and Whites, though Park in his initial program
(1925: 9-12) attached as much importance to the issue of social classes as
racial segregation and though an important article by Duncan and Duncan
(1955a), one of the very first statistical studies of segregation, bears on
socio-economic segregation. This contrast, which exceeds the question of
segregation and raises the issue of dominant modes of social categorization,
reflects, as Chenu notes (see Chauvel et al. 2002), major differences in how
the issue is viewed or thematized (Schulteis 1998) in social science research
in the two societies.
Since the late 1970s, however, an increasing number of research studies
have been done in France on the urban situation of immigrants, and many
monographs on deprived neighborhoods—e.g., Dubet and Lapeyronnie’s
R. franç. sociol., 52, Supplement, 2011, 31-62
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* My thanks to Hugues Lagrange, Marco Oberti, Loïc Wacquant and the two anonymous Revue
readers for their helpful remarks.
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1992 study—have stressed the strong presence of immigrants in those neigh-
borhoods. Attention to ethno-racial discrimination processes(1) has led to
probing not only those particular situations and the conflicts they give rise to
(Lagrange and Oberti 2006) but also the intensity and possible accentuation
of ethno-racial segregation in major French cities.
One important reason for examining the problem in ethno-racial terms is
that the political and policy debate in France has already cast it in those terms,
and urban policy of the last twenty years has been shaped by the concern to
combat intensified urban segregation. While the political-institutional debate
usually does not go beyond promoting social mix, that term is often a euphe-
mism for ethno-racial residential mix.(2) In fact, that kind of residential mix
only became the official goal of public policy after a considerable increase in
the proportion of immigrants from North Africa and sub-Saharan Africa
living in state-subsidized housing projects—groups who had been largely
excluded from public housing until the late 1960s.(3)
The widespread view in France is that social but more particularly
ethno-racial segregation has been intensifying, and that this has led to the
development of genuine ethnic ghettos in areas in the outskirts of Paris with a
high concentration of state-subsidized housing projects, and that this in turn
was one cause of the November 2005 riots.(4) France’s “social mix” policy,
which is based on this reading of the situation, has called for greater disper-
sion of state-subsidized housing among the various municipalities (cf. the
1991 “urban development guideline” law and the “solidarity and urban
renewal” law of 2000), and its “cities” policy has continued along the same
line, calling for greater social mix in neighborhoods understood to be “in
trouble,” the so-called “zones urbaines sensibles.” This has now translated
into moves to reduce proportions of poor and immigrant households when
resettling people in neighborhoods that are the focus of current urban renewal
policy.
In an earlier study of the Paris metropolitan area (Préteceille 2006a),
I combined the detailed socio-occupational categories defined by the Institut
National de la Statistique et des Études Économiques (INSEE) with unem-
ployment and socio-economic “precariousness” variables to study social
segregation, and showed that it is actually changing in quite a different way
from the widely-held view just summarized. In fact, the segregation index for
most social categories is decreasing. It is rising only for business managers
and private sector professionals and for manual workers. Social mix, then, is
32
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(1) See below for a discussion of what is
meant by the term “ethno-racial.”
(2) See, for example, Kirszbaum (1999).
(3) Pinçon (1976) showed that in 1968,
only 5.5% of working (or job-seeking) foreig-
ners were living in public housing in the greater
Paris area, versus 15.3% of working (or
job-seeking) French persons.
(4) The November 2005 riots started in
Clichy-sous-Bois after two youngsters chased
by the police hid in a transformer and were
electrocuted to death. Rioting subsequently
spread to other neighborhoods throughout the
country and lasted several weeks. Images of
cars aflame in France were diffused by the
media worldwide.
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holding stable, but bipolarization may be observed at the extremes due to the
increasing exclusiveness of wealthy neighborhoods and the sharp increase in
percentage of jobless or socio-economically insecure in the poorest neighbor-
hoods. These results refute the widespread understanding in terms of “urban
dualization,” “generalized separatism,” and “middle class secession,” but of
course they say nothing of trends in ethno-racial segregation. While some
monographic neighborhood studies show greater concentrations of immi-
grants and some local observations note a high proportion of “colored” popu-
lations in some areas, we have no overall analysis of changes in immigrant
concentrations that might give these sporadic observations greater general
relevance or validate the opinions—mistakenly considered facts—of most
political actors and journalists.
In this article I provide a statistical analysis of changes in level of immi-
grant segregation in the greater Paris metropolitan area. Regardless of their
limitations, statistics are indispensable if we wish to move beyond particular
cases and grasp an overall dynamic. Since Guillon’s pioneering study (1992),
several research contributions have shed light on the situation of immigrants
in the Paris urban area; see Rhein 1998, the Atlas des populations immigrées
en Île-de-France (INSEE-FASILD 2004) and Safi’s doctoral thesis (2007). My
purpose here is to answer the question in the title of the article by means of a
systematic analysis of how the situation has changed. It should be recalled
that the greater Paris metropolitan area is a particularly important case study
for understanding the situation of immigrants in French society as a whole. In
1999,(5) the area accounted for more than 40% of all immigrants living in
mainland France, and for an even higher proportion of new immigrants, who
have more difficulties finding housing and employment. The gap between the
income and living conditions of people residing in the area’s wealthy neigh-
borhoods and those living in its poorest ones is greater than for all other
French cities. And some districts in the outskirts of Paris have been among
those most publicized for incidents between the police and young people of
immigrant background.
To analyze segregation in the greater Paris metropolitan area, it is impor-
tant first of all to specify the categories used—the task of the first part of this
article. In the second part I analyze changes in the size of the various immi-
grant groups. In the third I study changes in spatial distribution inequalities,
measured by a dissimilarity index. In the fourth, I consider the same question
for a wider population that includes immigrants’ children, part of the “second
33
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(5) The most recent data available to me
were from the 1999 census, the last of its kind.
Detailed data from the surveys conducted since
2004 for the new census process are not yet
available; only aggregate figures have been
published. And the new census data will raise
serious methodological problems for the study
of urban segregation, particularly change in
segregation levels, since only a sample of
communes, districts or neighborhoods is
surveyed each year and the samples rotate over
a period of five years. The data available for
describing a city for one given census year will
therefore be a combination of local results
collected over five years’ time.
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generation.” In the fifth I examine immigrants’ relative levels of isolation.
And in the sixth, I analyze the degree of concentration in different areas.
“Ethno-Racial” Categories and Urban Spaces
The study of ethno-racial segregation derives from the hypothesis that
imputed racial or ethnic characteristics, or actual cultural characteristics, can
cause processes of differentiated residential distribution that spatially distance
certain groups from other groups. The question then arises as to what statistic
variables should be chosen to describe the residential population as a function
of this hypothesis.(6) But the hypothesis itself is more complex than may
appear.
Residential segregation may be the effect of discrimination in access to
housing. Several case studies of the selection and management policies of
social housing institutions and of private landlords’ and real estate agents’
behavior have demonstrated that discrimination exists, though it has not been
possible to deduce its frequency, intensity or the effects it has on urban
composition. In France, discrimination based on skin color or supposed
belonging to a particular ethnic group, imputed on the basis of name, clothes,
country of origin, or other traits, cannot be analyzed statistically and is prob-
ably underestimated because there are no official statistical categories for
measuring such characteristics (see Simon and Stavo-Debauge 2004). Races
do not exist as biological differences that might explain social differences,(7)
but if there are enough racists in society going about with the belief that the
Black or Arab race exists and consequently discriminating against persons
assumed to belong to those “races,” this results in categorization that exists
through its own practical effects. Should researchers use categories thus
defined or imposed in their analyses of social phenomena? Should those cate-
gories be used by the state in systematic collection of public data on its popu-
lation? These are heated issues in current French debate on approaches to
ethno-racial categorization in the social sciences (see the set of studies edited
by Martiniello and Simon 2005) and on the eventuality of introducing “ethnic
statistics” into French public statistics and public policy to combat discrimi-
nation (see the recent report by the COMEDD committee chaired by Héran
2010).
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(6) As I have argued elsewhere (Préteceille
2004), variables and spatial units alike should
be chosen on the basis of predetermined theore-
tical hypotheses about what processes produce
segregation, and at a scale that is relevant for
analyzing the social practices and interactions
at issue.
(7) Despite claims and “demonstrations” to
the contrary by some scientists, particularly in
the US, in publications that have received
heavy media attention; e.g., Herrnstein and
Murray (1994), or recent declarations by
Watson, 1962 Nobel laureate in medicine,
about Africans’ “inferior intelligence.”
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Moreover, discrimination itself results from highly diverse practices. There
is an entire set of discriminatory practices, ranging from organized actions,
policies that may in fact be instituted by public agencies (city governments,
public housing agencies), practices of economic agents (real estate agents,
lending businesses such as those in the US that used “redlining”)—all of
which may treat service users differently on the basis of more or less explicit
racial criteria—to “diffuse” discrimination of the sort that results from a
series of “microdecisions”(8) made by many individual actors, each of whom
is only slightly racist. Discrimination can also be indirect, meaning for our
purposes that discrimination operating in a different sphere of social prac-
tices—on the labor market, for example—affects place of residence. There is
no reason to think that in France, a country where—in direct contrast to the
United States—racial categorization has not been consolidated as a legitimate
public representation of reality, the implicit categorizations operative in these
different types of discrimination processes are homogeneous, congruent or
stable over time.
Ethno-racial differentiation of residential space can also result from
processes of self-aggregation, processes that may be qualified as “ethnic” in a
vague way, in the sense that there may be a variety of cultural reasons for them:
linguistic (living near people who speak your language—this applies especially
to new immigrants who speak the receiving country’s language poorly or not at
all); religious (living near places of worship where you can practice your reli-
gion); etc. But the reasons may also be economic (your ethnic group’s social
network may be in a position to help you find work or housing) or
family-related (living near family members invigorates family social ties,
resource exchange, mutual assistance—this reason is hardly limited to immi-
grants), etc. But in this case, the way that the group one wishes to belong to and
the individuals belonging to that group categorize themselves may reasonably
be assumed different from the way a discriminator who means to keep “the
other” at a distance categorizes them. Not to mention the fact that, as several
socio-anthropology studies have shown, the social identities people draw upon
are complex and change over time.
The literature on migration processes has long focused on this sort of
self-grouping. The now classic 1985 study by Portes and Bach, for example,
showed the extent of the development of “ethnic enclaves” in some US cities.
In France there is a growing inclination among some politicians to impute
immigrant segregation to immigrant desire for “communitarian withdrawal,”
implying immigrant refusal to become integrated—a view contradicted by
many survey results, such as the MGIS Survey (Tribalat 1996) and the results
obtained by Brouard and Tiberj (2005). While it seems a kind of political
delusion to claim that the phenomenon of segregation as a whole results from
communitarianist desires—the classic move of “blaming the victim”—it is
true that some spatial groupings do at least in part reflect such immigrant
35
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(8) Schelling’s interpretation (1978).
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desires; e.g., groups that settle as property owners in a particular
neighborhood.
While the matter of theoretically defining suitable categories for analyzing
ethno-racial segregation is, as we have seen, an extremely complex one, the
practical options available in France for studying the issue are quite limited.
The only source that allows for statistically analyzing social differentation of
residential space—since such analysis must be done at a small spatial
scale—is the census, and the only relevant information it contains is house-
hold member nationality and country of birth.(9) I will be using this informa-
tion here, and adding birth in French “départements” or “territoires” outside
mainland France—the so called DOM-TOMs (e.g., Martinique and
Guadeloupe, Reunion Island, etc.). Immigrants’ national origin will therefore
be used as a proxy variable for ethno-racial characteristics likely to cause
residential segregation. Though the choice is constrained, this variable is not
such a bad solution, and it is highly preferable to extremely composite
ethno-racial categories such as “Blacks,” “Arabs,” “Asians.” First, unlike
those categories, it does not give credence to racist prejudices; second, it
allows for detailing immigrant origins finely enough that the categorization
will closely approximate immigrants’ original cultural identities and enable us
to identify distinct migration processes.
But there are problems and limitations to this solution. One major—and
underestimated—problem is that though this information is collected, it is not
necessarily readily accessible. INSEE has declared its detailed information on
immigrant origin “sensitive,” and it can only be obtained through special
permission and for spatial units of 5,000 or more inhabitants.(10) The main
problem here is that there may be categories of French citizens or people born
in mainland France—i.e., people who are not immigrants—who are nonethe-
less subject to discrimination on the basis of skin color or ethnic identity
imputed on the basis of name. This applies primarily to what are called the
“second generation”; i.e., following Borrel and Simon’s definition (2005),
persons born in mainland France to at least one immigrant parent. The census
only allows researchers to identify as “second generation” persons who are
still living with their immigrant parents.
Not all nationalities could be accounted for, both because the number of
nationalities represented was so high and because of the statistical constraints.(11)
I ultimately opted for the category definitions in Figure 1—either relatively
large groups or sets of smaller ones from major world regions. I have also
36
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(9) Parents’ national origin and how long
they have been living in France are collected by
other surveys, but not by the census.
(10) Public institution moves to withold
information may reasonably be understood to
have the opposite effect of the “neutralization”
aimed at, as they leave people free to fantasize
about immigrant invasion and reinforce demands
for “ethnic statistics.”
(11) Segregation is studied by comparing
residential distributions of given groups within
a set of spatial units. Data reliability decreases
due to sampling when for some groups there are
very small numbers in many spatial units, and
comparison becomes technically difficult when
some groups are very small relative to others.
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distinguished between immigrants and French natives from outside mainland
France (the Départements et Territoires d’Outre-Mer or DOM-TOMs), who
once again are not immigrants but are likely to undergo racist discrimination
because of skin color.
This way of framing the field to be taken into account when measuring
ethno-racial segregation raises the problem of how accurately immigrants are
being counted.(12) The problem exists for both legal immigrants (see, among
others, Ngwe 2006) and illegal ones, though it is different for the two cases.
Héran (in Buffet 2006) has estimated that in the late 1990s there were approx-
imately 300,000 illegal immigrants living in France. If we estimate that half
of them are living in the greater Paris metropolitan area, then we have to
increase the overall number of immigrants in 1999 by 150,000, i.e., 9% of
immigrants living in the greater Paris metropolitan area. However, the figure
is very likely higher for growing immigrant groups—the groups that most
illegal immigrants are likely to belong to. For those groups, then, we have to
take this uncertainty factor into account in interpreting the results presented
below.
In determining the spaces and spatial breakdowns to be studied, I had to
operate under the constraints of limited access to information and how that
information is defined. Ideally, we should be able to study the entire Paris
urban area using INSEE’s spatial breakdown into what can be considered the
most adequate units for analyzing segregation; i.e., IRISes, neighborhoods of
approximately 2,000 inhabitants.(13) But because INSEE applies the regula-
tions of the Commission Nationale Informatique et Libertés, researchers can
only access information on immigrants’ original nationalities for what are
called TRIRISes(14) and communes (municipalities) of at least 5,000 inhabit-
ants. Since only municipalities and not TRIRISes can be used for earlier
censuses, I studied the 340 municipalities in the outskirts of Paris for which
1999 data was available, and the municipality of Paris as traditionally divided
into 80 districts.(15) Since I had to leave aside municipalities with populations
below 5,000, I could only study 90% of the total population of the
37
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(12) According to INSEE, the results of the
census surveys done in 2004 and 2005,
combined with other sources, indicate that the
number of immigrants given for 1999 was
actually higher, but there is no indication of
how much higher; see Borrel (2006).
(13) For a discussion of relevant spaces and
scales, see Préteceille (2006a). IRIS (Ilôts
Regroupés pour l’Information Statistique) are
small standardized units that were first used by
INSEE in releasing data from the 1999 census.
They are the smallest areas of analysis possible,
and correspond reasonably well to what can be
considered the scale of everyday neighborhood
experience. They are slightly smaller on
average than US census tracts.
(14) A TRIRIS is usually a set of three
adjacent IRISes and encompasses at least 5,000
residents.
(15) Paris is divided into 20 arrondisse-
ments, which are administrative units, and each
arrondissement is divided into 4 districts
(quartiers). These districts have had stable
boundaries over time and can therefore be used
to analyze changes. They are useful in compa-
risons with other municipalities since the
municipality of Paris is so much bigger. Due to
the minimum size constraint, I had to combine
Paris districts 1 and 3; and 4, 5 and 6.
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Île-de-France region(16), and 96% of its immigrant population. Consequently,
segregation between immigrants and French-born residents is slightly under-
estimated, as immigrants are sharply underrepresented in the small municipal-
ities that could not be studied, most of which are to be found in the less dense
“outer ring” of greater Paris area suburbs and in the outlying semi-urban area.
Changes in Immigrant Group Numbers
Before analyzing the degree of segregation of the various immigrant
groups, it is useful to have a general overview of their respective proportions
and changes in those proportions. The figures for the greater Paris metropol-
itan area (Figure 1 and figures in Table A-1 in the Appendix) show that the
number of French persons born in mainland France and living in the Île-de-
France region rose 4.7% from 1982 to 1990 and 2% from 1990 to 1999, for a
total of 8.36 million. For French persons born in the DOM-TOMs and living
in Île-de-France the situation was different: their numbers increased sharply,
then fell, for a total of 191,000 persons in 1999.
Between 1982 and 1999 the total number of immigrants rose from 1.3 to
1.6 million.(17) The increase was greater from 1982 to 1990 than from 1990 to
1999; it was also much greater than for the non-immigrant population.
Though the total weight of the immigrant population increased only
slightly—from 13.3% to 14.7% over that period—population composition by
origin changed considerably.
The Portuguese are the biggest group of European immigrants; their
numbers fell slightly over the period. Italians and Spaniards fell sharply.
Eastern Europeans also fell slightly, while Northern Europeans increased. The
overall weight of European immigrants fell perceptibly—from 6.7% to 5.3%
of all inhabitants of the greater Paris metropolitan area.
The largest North African immigrant group was from Algeria, but their
numbers remained stable over the period, as did those for immigrants from
Tunisia, whereas number of Moroccan immigrants rose sharply; there are now
three-quarters as many Moroccan as Algerian immigrants. The overall
proportion of North African immigrants rose slightly, from 3.9% to 4.2%.
38
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(16) The “region” in France is the first
subnational tier of government; the country is
divided into 22 regions. In 1999, the
Île-de-France region coincided fairly closely
with the Paris metropolitan area.
(17) This is according to the official
definition: persons born non-French outside
France. That definition encompasses foreign-
born foreigners and foreign-born persons who
have acquired French citizenship, but not
French-born foreigners or French-born persons
who have acquired French citizenship, and
obviously not foreign-born French persons.
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The number of immigrants from sub-Saharan Africa increased more than
any other group, doubling between 1982 and 1999. In 1999 there were more
of these immigrants than immigrants from Morocco and almost as many as
those from Algeria. But the total weight of sub-Saharan African immigrants is
still low: less than 2% of the total population.
In 1982 France had very few immigrants from Turkey, the Middle East,
India and Pakistan, etc. Their numbers too rose sharply over the period,
though each of the three groups is still smaller than the Tunisian group, for
example. The number of immigrants from Latin America was approximately
the same as for Turkey, etc., but did not rise as much. Lastly, East and South-
east Asian immigrants increased sharply, exceeding Tunisians and Spaniards
in 1999. This set of immigrants, most of whom belong to groups other than
39
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(18) Unless otherwise indicated, the data
used in this article are from my analysis of the
1982 and 1990 census files and, for the 1999
census, my analysis of specially constructed
census tables—all material made available to
me by the Centre Maurice Halbwachs-ADISP.
Special thanks to Alexandre Kych for his
precious assistance in drawing up that set of
tables.
FIGURE 1. – Immigrant Group Numbers (Région Île-de-France, 1982-1990-1999)
Source: Censuses, INSEE.(18)
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those implicated in post-colonial migrations, more than doubled in absolute
numbers, and its relative weight in the total population rose from 1.7% to
3.1%—substantially more than sub-Saharan African immigrants.
This simple description of the structure of the immigrant population in the
Paris metropolitan area already gives quite a different picture from the one
that dominates public and media debate, where the “immigration problem” is
essentially posed in terms of migration flows from Northern and sub-Saharan
Africa. In 1999, those two immigrant groups combined accounted for no more
than 6.1% of the total population of the greater Paris metropolitan area and
41% of its total immigrant population, and their combined weight had only
moderately increased from 1982, when it stood at 36%. There has been only a
slight fall in the number of European immigrants; they now account for 5.3%
of the total population. Meanwhile the combined total for the other groups
exceeds 3% and has gone up more in absolute terms than the figure for
sub-Saharan African immigrants.
Changes in Immigrant Spatial Distribution Inequalities
The primary aspect of segregation, the one that greatly conditions the
degree to which relations between immigrants and non-immigrants are even
possible, as well as the two groups’ (unequal) access to city resources, is
unequal residential distribution. Since Duncan and Duncan’s pathbreaking
study (1955b), researchers have tended to study this dimension by means of
the dissimilarity index, which compares spatial distributions for the two
groups.(19) The advantage of this approach is that it involves a simple, intu-
itive interpretation—percentage of one group that would have to move in
order for the two groups to be distributed similarly—that can then be
compared with a substantial quantity of published results.
To measure segregation and changes in it, I first used the categories and
spaces indicated before to calculate a dissimilarity index that would allow for
comparing distribution of each immigrant group and of French persons from
the DOM-TOMs with distribution of the reference group, i.e., French persons
born in mainland France (see Table 1).
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(19) See Massey and Denton’s classic
article (1988) for an analysis of the various
segregation dimensions and a detailed presen-
tation and discussion of the various indexes,
including the dissimilarity index.
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TABLE 1. – Dissimilarity Indexes for Immigrant Groups Living in the Greater
Paris Metropolitan Area (1982-1990-1999)
ID 1982 1990 1999
French persons born in the DOM-TOMs 0.284 0.287 0.295
United States, Canada, New Zealand, Australia 0.544 0.503 0.468
Northern Europe 0.309 0.313 0.308
Eastern Europe 0.295 0.281 0.259
Italy 0.186 0.193 0.186
Spain 0.246 0.231 0.202
Portugal 0.197 0.187 0.197
Algeria 0.317 0.319 0.334
Tunisia 0.368 0.360 0.332
Morocco 0.349 0.327 0.333
Sub-Saharan Africa 0.357 0.333 0.330
Turkey 0.431 0.448 0.470
Middle East 0.439 0.370 0.312
India, Pakistan, etc. 0.349 0.338 0.340
East and Southeast Asia 0.347 0.346 0.344
Latin America 0.403 0.315 0.261
Others 0.607 0.476 0.467
It is important to explain how the reference group was defined, because the
results partially depend on it. I chose to define it as the set of French persons
born French in mainland France and not living with an immigrant parent. This
is a narrower definition than “non-immigrant,” as it excludes identifiable
members of the second generation and allows for a reference group that will
also work for the second set of calculations, where second generation
members were added to immigrants (see below). If we were only interested in
the ethnic aspect in the anthropological sense, this group would be too narrow
because the linguistic, cultural and family integration process transforms
identities and involves a gradual integration process whereby many members
of the second generation come to belong more fully to the main ethnic group
than to their immigrant parent’s ethnic group. But since we are interested here
in segregation as a possible result of ethno-racial discrimination, it is clear
that these same persons may be subject to discrimination on the basis of skin
color, name, imputed identity, regardless of their degree of cultural integra-
tion. This explains the above definition. The set of immigrants plus non immi-
grant children living with at least one immigrant parent can be understood to
correspond to the population of households whose head or spouse is an immi-
grant likely to undergo ethno-racial discrimination that may affect his or her
residential situation—discrimination that also obviously determines the
situation of any child(ren) living with that parent.
The strongest dissimilarity index in 1982 and 1990 was for immigrants
from the United States, Canada, Australia and New Zealand. Their numbers
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are low, and we can reasonably assume that the strong segregation level for
this group reflects above all their belonging to high social categories, which
are the most sharply segregated socio-occupational ones (Préteceille 2006a).
Immigrants from Italy, Spain and Portugal have the lowest indexes—around
0.2 in 1999, and these have either fallen or remained stable. Immigrants from
Eastern Europe have a slightly higher index, but it is significantly decreasing.
The four groups of immigrants from Northern Africa and sub-Saharan
Africa have similar indexes—close to 0.33 in 1999 and sharply higher than
immigrants from Italy, Spain or Portugal. However, scores within this group
have changed in slightly different ways: the index for Algerians underwent a
slight increase in the 1980s and a sharper one in the 1990s, for a total increase
of 5.5%; the index for Tunisian immigrants fell regularly, for a total decrease
of 9.7% from 1982 to 1999; the index for immigrants from Morocco fell in
the first period and increased slightly in the second, losing a total of 4.4%; for
sub-Saharan African immigrants it fell sharply in the first period and slightly
in the second for an overall decrease of 7.6%.
As noted, these four groups are at the center of public debate on immigra-
tion. The immigrants stigmatized by racist discourse in France and suspected
of endangering the republican model by “communitarian withdrawal” into
“ghettos” are North African or African immigrants, a fact which highlights
the weight of the post-colonial dimension in the construction of French social
representations of immigrants. In fact, this group is a minority and the propor-
tion of these immigrants in the total population is only slightly increasing. It
is therefore particularly important to note that the degree of segregation of
these four immigrant groups fell or remained nearly stable in the 1980s, then
remained nearly stable or only slightly increased in the 1990s. There was
indeed an inflection in the last decade of the twentieth century, but for some
of these groups, the segregation intensification was very slight.(20) Note also
the disparities among the four groups, namely for the two whose numbers
rose the least, Algeria and Tunisia: segregation of Algerian immigrants
increased slightly while falling for Tunisian immigrants. If we look now at
the two groups that grew the most—Morocco and sub-Saharan Africa—we
see that segregation of Moroccan immigrants increased very slightly in the
1990s while sub-Saharan immigrant segregation fell very slightly.
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(20) These results are slightly different
from the ones I published earlier (Préteceille
2006b, 2007), which showed a slightly lower
degree of segregation and a slight fall in segre-
gation for those categories. The difference is
primarily due to the more restrictive definition
of the reference group used here in calculating
the indexes; i.e., French persons born French in
mainland France and excluding children living
with immigrant parent(s). As explained, this
new definition is decidedly more relevant for
assessing the situation of groups likely to be
discriminated against on ethno-racial grounds.
This in turn demonstrates that it is not enough
to take into account individuals’ nationality and
place of birth. Nonetheless, the difference
amounts more to an inflexion—though a signi-
ficant one—than a dramatic change: a shift
from a slight fall to a slight rise in segregation
for several groups.
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It is likely that the dissimilarity index of the respective groups would rise
slighly if we took into account illegal immigrants, since they are likely to live
either with other members of the same group (family or friends) or near them.
But in order for that to indicate a rising trend in segregation for the four
groups, the number of illegal immigrants not counted by the census would
have to have increased sharply in the 1990s compared to previous decades.
We have no indication that this happened, though the hypothesis cannot be
discarded due to the tightening of restrictions on legal immigration and
number of visas delivered.
Turkish immigrants (next in the table) show the highest dissimilarity index
for 1999: over 40% higher than for all North African immigrant groups. And
in contrast to those groups, the index for immigrants from Turkey rose
sharply in both periods, 1982-1990, 1990-1999.
There were fewer immigrants from the Middle East than Turkey, and their
numbers did not rise as fast. In 1982 they were slightly more intensely segre-
gated than Turkish immigrants, but their dissimilarity index has fallen sharply,
bringing them to the same level as the North African groups. The Middle
Eastern immigrant group is quite heterogeneous, encompassing immigrants
from Lebanon, Syria, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, etc., and the fall in segregation for the
group as a whole may mask increased segregation for several subgroups.
The number gap for the next two groups—immigrants from India, Pakistan,
Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, etc., and immigrants from China, Southeast Asia and
Japan—is very wide: few immigrants in the first group, substantially more in
the second. Both groups increased considerably, reaching a total close to that
for sub-Saharan African immigrants. For both groups, segregation level either
remained stable or fell slightly, depending on the period, and in 1999 was
slightly higher than for North African immigrants.
Numbers for the last group, immigrants from Latin America, were very
low in 1982, and this group was sharply segregated. Over the two periods
their numbers nearly doubled, but the dissimilarity index fell sharply, ending
well below that for North African immigrants. It can be assumed that early in
the period, these were small, close-knit communities—Chilean, Argentine and
Brazilian political refugees—whereas recent migration has probably been for
economic reasons.
Lastly, we should note the relatively high dissimilarity index for French
persons born in the DOM-TOMs—higher than for European immigrants and
only slightly below the index for North African immigrants. These are French
citizens who attended French schools and have French-sounding names, so
this result can only support the hypothesis (though not demonstrate it—I will
return to this point) that this group is racially discriminated against on
the basis of skin color.(21) Moreover, degree of segregation for this group
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(21) The way the group is defined actually
results in an excessive estimate of the number of
dark-skinned persons likely to suffer discrimi-
nation, as it includes children of French persons of
European origin who settled in the DOM-TOMs
but have now returned to mainland France.
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increased slightly in the 1980s and even more in the 1990s—just as it did for
Algerian immigrants.
How are we to comparatively assess ethno-racial segregation in the greater
Paris metropolitan area? The compulsory reference is the United States, but
here we encounter a disparity in scale. Published results for American
cities(22) have usually been calculated on the basis of census tracts, units of
approximately 4,000 inhabitants. This gave a Black/White dissimilarity index
of 0.81 for Chicago in 2000 and 0.82 for New York; for Hispanics and Whites
the figures were 0.62 for Chicago, 0.67 for New York; the Asian/White index
was 0.44 for Chicago and 0.50 for New York.
I calculated Paris dissimilarity indexes at the TRIRIS scale (> 5,000 inhab-
itants; once again, this INSEE-defined unit is slightly larger on average than a
US census tract); for some groups, however, I was able to work at the IRIS
scale.(23) By interpolating from these values (see Appendix, Figure A-1), I
estimate the dissimilarity index between the most intensely segregated immi-
grant groups—from North Africa and sub-Saharan Africa—and the reference
group (French persons born in mainland France) for units similar in size to
US census tracts to be approximately 0.40—one half the Black/White dissimi-
larity index for New York or Chicago; two-thirds the Hispanic/White index
and four-fifths the Asian/White index for those cities. This means that even
the moderately rising French dissimilarity indexes are incomparable to the
situation of African-Americans in the largest American cities and even to the
situation of Latin American immigrants and their children (“Hispanics”).
Immigrants and the Second Generation
Do these results change if we take into account the second generation? As
mentioned, French census information only allows for identifying members of
that generation still living with their parents. The national survey samples that
we have for studying the second generation are too small to allow for
analyzing spatial distributions. On the basis of data from the Études des
histoires familiales survey, Borrel and Simon have estimated the second
generation—defined, it will be recalled, as all French persons with at least
one immigrant parent—at 7.7% of the total population, a figure close to that
for first generation immigrants: 7.4% (2005: 435). They note that the Italian
second generation is the largest group, and that the Italian, Spanish and Portu-
guese groups together account for 46% of the second generation. Children
with at least one Algerian parent account for 14.1% of the second generation,
and the entire North African and sub-Saharan African second generation
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(22) See, for example, Massey and Denton
(1993) and studies by Logan and his research
team: http://www.s4.brown.edu/cen2000/.
(23) These estimates were made in the
framework of a research agreement with
INSEE’s Direction Régionale Île-de-France.
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account for 33.1% of the total—1.5 million persons in 1999, slightly below
the total for the first generation, i.e., 1.69 million for all of France.
However, the second generation age group structure differs by immigrant
group, reflecting both how long ago the group immigrated, type of migration
by period, and group birth rate. The more recently a group arrived, the greater
the proportion of young people in its second generation. Borrel and Simon
(2005: 436) estimate that 15% of Spaniard immigrants’ children and 8%
of Italian immigrants’ children are young people, whereas the figure for
sub-Saharan African immigrants’ children is 84%. For the most recent immi-
grant groups—from Portugal, Morocco, sub-Saharan Africa, India-Pakistan
and Asia—the second generation is made up primarily of young people, many
of whom still live with their parents.
I therefore conclude that the measure I have been able to take of numbers
of second generation children living with their parents in the greater Paris
metropolitan area is clearly an underestimation for the earlier immigration
groups (including Algerians) but is more accurate for more recent groups.
Figure 2 shows changes in this subset for the previously defined immigrant
groups.
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FIGURE 2. – Second Generation Living with Parents by Immigrant Group
(Île-de-France)
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Clearly, the groups with the most children living with an immigrant parent
are the largest immigrant groups: Portuguese, North Africans and sub-
Saharan Africans. It is for those groups that the proportion of this segment of
the second generation (i.e., children still living with parents) compared to the
first generation is heaviest—on average over 60%.
Over the period this situation developed as follows: number of children
living with Northern European immigrant parent(s) fell; number of children
living with Portuguese immigrant parent(s) remained stable; for all other
groups, number of children living with immigrant parent(s) rose. The sharpest
rises were in the Moroccan and sub-Saharan groups, where second-genera-
tion-living-with-parent increased more than first-generation immigrants.
The growth rate for second generation living with immigrant parents was
very high (and higher than first-generation numbers) for all recent immigrant
groups. The lowest figure for the 1990-1999 period was for the Moroccan
group—48%; for the sub-Saharan, Turkish and Indo-Pakistani groups it was
over 100%.
Table 2 presents dissimilarity indexes for the same groups, calculated this
time for immigrants plus second generation living with immigrant parents.
The reference group is the same as for Table 1.
The first thing to note is that these indices differ only slightly from those
obtained for the previous group definition; the ratios between the values
obtained with this new generation and without it range from 0.87 to 1.04. In
1999, the new index was slightly higher for the Portuguese, North African
and sub-Saharan groups (ratio of 1.04), the Turkish group (1.03) and the
Moroccan and Indo-Pakistani groups (1.02). It was much lower for the
Northern European (0.88), Eastern European (0.91), Spanish (0.90), Middle
Eastern (0.91) and Latin American (0.94) groups.
Over the period, we again observe a falling trend for immigrants of Euro-
pean origin, with the exception of the Portuguese, where the relative variation
over the period—5.7%—is similar to what it was for the earlier definition.
The relative increase observed before for other first generation immigrants
becomes somewhat higher with the wider definition for the Algerian group
(7.1%/4.9%), the Moroccan group (5.1%/1.9%), the Turkish group
(8.4%/4.9%) and the Indo-Pakistani group (5.1%/0.4%). For the sub-Saharan
and Asian groups we see a slight rise in the index, in contrast to a slight fall
for the prior definition.
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TABLE 2. – Dissimilarity Indexes for Immigrant Groups in the Greater Paris
Metropolitan Area, Including Second Generation Living with Parents
ID 1982 1990 1999
United States, Canada, New Zealand, Australia 0.518 0.473 0.431
Northern Europe 0.277 0.279 0.272
Eastern Europe 0.262 0.253 0.237
Italy 0.194 0.197 0.187
Spain 0.214 0.206 0.181
Portugal 0.199 0.194 0.205
Algeria 0.326 0.325 0.348
Tunisia 0.346 0.343 0.327
Morocco 0.337 0.324 0.340
Sub-Saharan Africa 0.346 0.343 0.345
Turkey 0.426 0.447 0.484
Middle East 0.402 0.337 0.283
India, Pakistan, etc. 0.331 0.329 0.346
East and Southeast Asia 0.324 0.338 0.344
Latin America 0.381 0.295 0.246
Overall, taking into account second generation living with parents does not
significantly modify the segregation levels found for first-generation immi-
grants. However, we do find a slightly sharper rising trend in the dissimilarity
index—relative variation over 5%—between 1990 and 1999 for groups of
Turkish, Algerian, Portuguese, Moroccan and Indo-Pakistani origin (decreasing
order).
These results may be considered robust despite the fact that the second
generation was only partly included, since the majority of the second genera-
tion are young people in these recent immigration groups (except perhaps for
the Algerian group). Moreover, given the second generation’s relative upward
socio-occupational mobility,(24) and therefore the fact that members of the
second generation not living with their parents are somewhat less likely to
experience socio-economic segregation, it is reasonable to assume that if we
could take into account that other part of the second generation, this would
slightly reduce the observed segregation level rather than increase it.
Segregation, then, did intensify moderately but significantly over the
1990s for recently arrived groups, except for the Asian group, for whom the
rise was very slight, and the sub-Saharan group, for whom it has remained
nearly stable.
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(24) According to Meurs, Pailhé, and
Simon (2005), the unemployment rate for the
second generation is slightly below that for the
first generation (controlling for the difference
in age structure), and the second generation
have higher educational attainment. However,
the authors also found second-generation
upward socio-occupational mobility to be much
weaker than for French persons of French
origin.
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Immigrant Groups’ Relative Degrees of Residential Isolation
The second dimension of immigrant group segregation is degree to which a
group is either isolated or exposed to other groups, particularly the dominant
ethno-racial one. I have studied this by means of the isolation index, with
measures probability of having neighbors belonging to one’s own group
(Massey and Denton 1988).(25)
The index is, by construction, sensitive to group size even when adjusted.
It is therefore not surprising to find extremely low values for the US, etc. and
Latin American groups. For the four European immigrant groups—with the
exception of Portugal—it is also very low. And for all these groups, we see it
either remained stable over the period or fell. The index is also low and stable
for the Middle East group (see Table 3).
The Portuguese and Tunisian groups have a slightly higher index—around
0.010—which fell very slightly over the period.
TABLE 3. – Isolation Indexes(26) of Immigrant Groups in the Greater Paris
Metropolitan Area, Including Second Generation Living with Parents
Modified isolation index 1982 1990 1999
United States, Canada, New Zealand, Australia 0.005 0.005 0.005
Northern Europe 0.007 0.007 0.007
Eastern Europe 0.007 0.005 0.004
Italy 0.004 0.004 0.002
Spain 0.004 0.003 0.002
Portugal 0.011 0.010 0.009
Algeria 0.020 0.018 0.019
Tunisia 0.012 0.012 0.009
Morocco 0.016 0.018 0.021
Sub-Saharan Africa 0.008 0.013 0.018
Turkey 0.006 0.014 0.021
Middle East 0.005 0.006 0.005
India, Pakistan, etc. 0.002 0.004 0.007
East and Southeast Asia 0.010 0.020 0.020
Latin America 0.003 0.002 0.002
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(25) The extremely interesting debate
between Simpson (2004, 2005) and Johnston,
Poulsen, and Forrest (2005) on segregation in
British cities highlights the necessity of taking
these different dimensions into account. My
results are incomparable with theirs, however,
because the city of Bradford that they studied is
so much smaller than the greater Paris metropo-
litan area, as is their spatial unit, the “enume-
ration district.”
(26) The classic isolation index was modified
to take account of group size; see Johnston,
Poulsen and Forrest (2005: 1222).
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In 1999, five groups—from Algeria, Morocco, sub-Saharan Africa, Turkey
and Asia—had an isolation index of around 0.020; i.e., twice as high as the
one for the Portuguese and Tunisian groups. That index remained stable for
the Algerian group, whose numbers rose slightly;(27) it rose moderately for the
Moroccan group, whose numbers increased sharply; and rose sharply for the
remaining three groups—sub-Saharan African, Turkish and Asian—whose
numbers also rose sharply.
To get an idea of the significance of these indices relative to American
cities, I estimated them by interpolation (as I did for the dissimilarity indexes)
for units of a size comparable to a US census tract (see Figure A-2 in the
Appendix). For the sub-Saharan and Moroccan groups the value of the index
can be estimated at slightly over 0.050; slightly lower for the Algerian and
Portuguese groups. For Blacks in New York in 2000 the index is 0.60; in
Chicago 0.73—i.e., in both cases over ten times higher than the highest figure
for Paris. For Hispanics, the American figure is over eight times as high: 0.46
in New York, 0.48 in Chicago; and for Asians it is three times as high: 0.26 in
New York, 0.15 in Chicago (see Logan).
As mentioned, group size does explain a part of these differences. Blacks
account for 24% of the New York population and 19% of the Chicago popula-
tion. If we calculate the isolation index at US census tract scale for the North
African and sub-Saharan groups combined—i.e., 6.1% of the population of
the greater Paris metropolitan area—it rises to 0.135. But it is more relevant
to compare this figure with the figures for Asians in the US, since the overall
proportion of that group in American cities is closer to what it is in Paris and
thus much smaller: Asians account for 5% of Chicago’s population and 9.8%
of New York’s, and they are considered much less “segregated” than Blacks
or Hispanics. We see, then, that our revised isolation index for the combined
North African and sub-Saharan groups in France—0.135—is about the same
as for Asians in Chicago (0.15) and half as high as for Asians in New York
(0.26). And we can conclude that the isolation of immigrant groups in the
greater Paris metropolitan area is low compared to the situation of Blacks and
other ethnic minorities in US cities, though it is increasing for rapidly
growing groups.
Concentration in Certain Neighborhoods?
Concentration of certain groups in certain spaces is another dimension of
segregation. My use of the term here is different from Massey and Denton’s
(1988), who understood it to refer to the proportion of city space occupied by
a given minority group. In the greater Paris metropolitan area, where segrega-
tion is moderate and people are therefore likely to live in a somewhat mixed
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(27) Totals of Figures 1 and 2.
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neighborhood, it is likely that this moderate segregation level, as measured by
the dissimilarity index, for example, is due to an averaging out of situations
that may be quite different from each other, and that some neighborhoods
may be characterized by much higher concentrations of immigrants.
To study this aspect synthetically, I examined not the different “origin”
groups, as that would exceed the scope of this article,(28) but rather the immi-
grant population as a whole. A preliminary study of the spatial distribution of
the various groups does show residence location particularity for the
following groups: immigrants from the United States and Northern Europe;
from Portugal; from Italy and from Spain.(29) However, as mentioned, the
debates on ethno-racial “ghettoization” in France focus primarily on North
African and sub-Saharan immigrants and otherwise on Turkish, Indian and
Pakistani, Chinese and Southeast Asian immigrants. I therefore combined all
those groups, after checking that their residential distributions were reason-
ably similar.(30) Furthermore, in studying this composite group, henceforth
referred to as “non-European immigrants,” I have once again combined immi-
grants and second generation children living with their immigrant parent(s).
Municipalities and Paris districts were ranked by proportion of this
“non-European” population in their overall population. Percentage range
boundaries were defined on the basis of average proportion in 1999: 15%.
Table 4 shows the distribution of these spatial units for the same percentage
ranges in 1990 and 1999.
Clearly, the transition matrix from 1990 situations to 1999 situations is
sharply diagonal—stability predominates—with an overall shift toward the
higher percentage ranges. That shift makes sense given the overall increase in
the weight of this composite immigrant population: from 12.1% to 14.9%.
However, it can be seen that the shift primarily occurs toward adjacent
squares to the right of the diagonal, meaning that the proportion of immi-
grants increased almost everywhere, regardless of whether it was low,
moderate or high to begin with in 1990. There are only eight instances of
falling proportions, and only six instances of a two-square jump, i.e., a sharp
increase.
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(28) I am currently working on a detailed
study of spatial distributions of the various
immigrant groups.
(29) The correspondence analysis of the
table presenting numbers by immigrant group
and municipality shows a clear opposition on
this point between French persons born French
in mainland France and immigrant groups, with
the exception of the afore-cited groups.
(30) This is another difference between the
situation in Paris and ethno-racial segregation
in US cities: immigrant neighborhoods in Paris
tend to host immigrants of many different
origins, as was established decades ago for
Belleville or La Goutte d’Or, and similar mix
has been found outside central Paris.
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TABLE 4. – Distribution of Municipalities and Districts(31) by Percentage
of Immigrants (and Immigrants’ Children) in 1990 and 1999
1990\1999 0%-7.4% 7.5%-14.9% 15%-22.4% 22.5%-29.9% 30%-37.4% 37.5%-44.9% Total
0%-7.4% 158 44 1 203
7.5%-14.9% 6 93 31 130
15%-22.4% 1 36 17 3 57
22.5%-29.9% 1 8 11 2 22
30%-37.4% 2 5 7
37.5%-44.9% 1 1
Total 164 138 69 25 16 8 420
In neither 1990 nor 1999 did non-European immigrants as defined above
account for more than 50% of the population of any Paris metropolitan area
municipality or Paris district. In 1990, such immigrants accounted for more
than 30% of the population (i.e., more than twice the average proportion in
1999) of eight spatial units. One such unit—Lognes(32)—is in the Seine-et-
Marne département; there were two in the Yvelines (Mantes-la-Jolie,
Chanteloup-les-Vignes); one in Seine-Saint-Denis (Clichy-sous-Bois); two in
the Val-d’Oise (Garges-lès-Gonesse, Sarcelles); one in the Hauts-de-Seine
(Gennevilliers) and one in the city of Paris (La Goutte-d’or). In 1999, the
figure rose to 24: eight more municipalities in the département of Seine-
Saint-Denis (La Courneuve, Villetaneuse, Aubervilliers, Bobigny, Saint-Denis,
Stains, Pierrefitte-sur-Seine, Épinay-sur-Seine); two more in the Yvelines
(Trappes, Les Mureaux); one more in the Val-d’Oise (Villiers-le-Bel); one in
Essonne (Grigny); one more in the Hauts-de-Seine (Villeneuve-la-Garenne)
and three additional Paris districts (La Chapelle, La Villette, Pont-de-Flandre).
Altogether these 24 municipalities or districts where non-European immi-
grants represent more than 30% of the population accounted for 20% of the
non-European immigrant population in 1999.
At the municipality/district scale, then, there are no cases of heavy concen-
tration: in no municipality do non-European immigrant residents constitute a
majority. But there is no reason to think this result can be transposed to neigh-
borhood scales. At the TRIRIS scale (1,126 units with an average of 7,856 resi-
dents each), I had access to data for 1999 only. And here we do find 14 spatial
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(31) Once again, in studying change from
1990 to 1999, the only data I had access to was
at the commune scale. This led to underesti-
mating segregation in large municipalities that
encompass sharply contrasting districts or
neighborhoods. And the difficulty could only be
resolved for 1999 by using detailed data for the
TRIRISes (and aggregate data for certain
IRISes). But once again, I could not use data at
those scales retroactively for 1990 (though this
was theoretically possible, since INSEE does
have a table of correspondences between its
1990 residential units and IRISes, which is
what allowed me to construct and analyze
INSEE’s social categories at the IRIS scale for
1990) (Préteceille 2003, 2006a).
(32) This small municipality is exceptional
because the majority of its immigrant residents
are from Asia, whereas the others comprise a
mix of immigrants of different origins, as
indicated earlier.
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units where non-European immigrants account for more than 50% of the popu-
lation. The maximum is 70% for a TRIRIS in Clichy-sous-Bois (département
of Seine-Saint-Denis). There is one other such TRIRIS in Clichy-sous-Bois;
three in Mantes-la-Jolie, two in Aulnay-sous-Bois, one in Garges-lès-Gonesse,
one in La Courneuve, one in Les Mureaux, one in Corbeil-Essonnes, one in
Stains, and two in Sarcelles.
However, these 14 TRIRISes represent only 4.8% of the total non-Euro-
pean immigrant population of the greater Paris metropolitan area, and only
1.34% of the greater Paris metropolitan area population altogether. Heavy
concentration does exist at the TRIRIS scale, but it concerns only a tiny frac-
tion of both the non-European immigrant population and the area’s population
at large.
TABLE 5. – TRIRIS Distribution by % of Non-European Immigrants
(and Immigrants’ Children) in 1999
% ranges Number of TRIRISes Non-European immigrants Total population
0%-7.4% 280 114,276 2,153,597
7.5%-14.9% 371 305,543 2,891,839
15%-22.4% 212 305,443 1,681,571
22.5%-29.9% 125 254,743 989,951
30%-37.4% 74 197,719 586,665
37.5%-44.9% 36 123,165 307,551
45%-52.4% 19 77,698 160,142
52.5%-60% 4 18,467 32,385
> 60% 5 27,727 42,370
Total 1,126 1,424,781 8,846,071
If we consider the overall distribution (same percentage ranges as in
Table 4), we see that 29% of these immigrants live in TRIRISes where their
weight is below the 15% average while 69% live in TRIRISes where it is
below 30%.
Unfortunately, researchers do not have access to this kind of data at the
IRIS scale, the most relevant one for studying urban neighborhoods as expe-
rienced by their inhabitants. I could do no more than calculate proportion of
immigrants (not including their children) from places other than Italy, Spain
and Portugal. In only 31 of 4,779 IRISes with over 400 inhabitants in 1999
did such immigrants represent more than 50% of the total population;
they accounted for 2.5% of this immigrant population. The only way to
take second-generation-living-with-parent(s) into account (as done for the
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TRIRISes) was to estimate by applying the average rate observed for that
group; i.e., a ratio of 1.59 for non-European-immigrant-population-
plus-second generation to non-European-immigrant-population. In approxi-
mately 10 IRISes, this generates a proportion over 100%—these estimates
are therefore excessive.(33) However, in proceeding thus, we find 340 IRISes
in which over 50% of the population are non-European immigrants-plus-
second-generation; those IRISes in turn account for 20% of that composite
non-European population. Since we are dealing in overestimations here, we
can only conclude that the vast majority of the non-European immigrant
population live in neighborhoods (IRISes) in which they are not the
majority, though for a small but non-negligible sub-group, representing
between 2.5% and 20% of that total immigrant population, they are the
majority.
Since we have no data for 1990 at either the TRIRIS or IRIS scale, we
obviously cannot analyze change over the decade. However, if we compare
the proportion of immigrant residents per IRIS (all groups combined) with the
proportion of such residents in municipalities in 1999, we find a correlation of
0.744,(34) meaning a strong correspondence between the two levels. We can
therefore reasonably hypothesize that infra-municipal change is fairly closely
aligned with change at the municipal level itself.
The number of non-European immigrants (and their children) in the area
studied grew by 330,000 persons from 1990 and 1999, a growth rate of 28.9%
between the two censuses. Nearly half of this increase (46.9%) occurred in
municipalities where non-European immigrants represented less than 15% of
the resident population in 1990. Virtually the same percentage of the increase
(46.6%) occurred in municipalities where that immigrant population was
slightly overrepresented in 1990 (15% to 30%). And only 6.5% of the
increase occurred in municipalities where that immigrant population was
already heavily represented—over 30%—in 1990. At the scale of the munici-
pality or Paris district, most of the growth in the non-European immigrant
population occurred through a spreading of that population into spaces where
it became only slightly to moderately concentrated; little of it corresponded to
further concentration of already concentrated residential areas, and for those
areas, the growth rate was lower than for that of the immigrant population at
large (25.3% versus 28.9%). Clearly the discourse in France on ethno-racial
“communitarian self-regrouping” expresses a fantasy rather than describing
reality, erroneously taking for a general trend a phenomenon in which no
more than a small percentage of residential spaces and immigrants are
implicated.
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(33) At the TRIRIS scale, the correlation
between immigrant and immigrant-plus-
second-generat ion-l iving-with-parent(s)
numbers is extremely high—0.96—while the
dispersion coefficient is low: 12%. But the fact
that applying the same average rate at the IRIS
scale generates proportions over 100% for
approximately 10 IRISes means that the
dispersion rate is necessarily much higher.
(34) Correlation based on the 4,063 IRISes
of at least 500 inhabitants that are part of
communes made up of at least two IRISes.
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** *
Moderate but Increasing Segregation
that Affects the Entire Paris Metropolitan Area
For immigrants from North Africa, sub-Saharan Africa, Turkey, East and
Southeast Asia, India and Pakistan, segregation in the sense of a difference
between how they are spatially distributed and how French persons born
French in mainland France(35) are distributed is much more pronounced than
for immigrants of European origin. In 1999 it was 1.7 times greater. And
segregation for these groups did increase, moderately, especially in last
decade of the twentieth century. Turkish immigrants are the most intensely
segregated group, and the group whose degree of segregation increased the
most over the period; their numbers are relatively low but increasing fast.
These general results, which also take into account the majority of the
second generation for all these groups (except for the group which began
migrating earliest: Algerians), seem robust at municipality and Paris district
scale. If it were possible to take into account illegal immigrants, this would
likely result in somewhat stronger segregation and perhaps greater intensifica-
tion of segregation over time, but it would not significantly change the general
order of magnitude established by this research. Likewise if it had been
possible to take into account the very small municipalities in the outer ring of
Paris suburbs and the semi-urban areas, this would have accentuated immigrant
segregation, since few immigrants live in those places, but it would not neces-
sarily have resulted in increased segregation intensity over the period.
For the first years of the twenty-first century all we have is aggregate data
for the greater Paris metropolitan area as a whole (dated January 1, 2005).(36)
They show that from 1999 to 2005, the number of immigrants living in
Île-de-France increased by 19%—a much higher increase than for non-immi-
grant residents (2.3%) and slightly above the growth rate for France as a
whole (15%). Given the acute tension on the housing market, it is unlikely
that this inflow of immigrants has spread evenly throughout the Paris metro-
politan area, and likely instead that the moderate intensification in segrega-
tion observed in the preceeding decade has been reinforced.
However, it will be no easy task to update this analysis when the new data
are available. First, the data on small spatial units to be included in the new
census material will have been collected over five different years, implying a
greater margin of error for analysis of segregation levels and changes in them.
Second, the relative weight of young people living with immigrant parent(s)
falls with length of time the group has been present in France, and this will
decrease the relevance of the method used here to study the second
Revue française de sociologie
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(35) And not living with an immigrant
parent.
(36) These results are from the first annual
waves for the new census and are available on
the INSEE site: www.insee.fr.
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generation. In order to keep the origin categories used here, we would need to
know the origin(s) of census respondent’s parents, but the new census form,
like its predecessor, does not include this question.
At the municipality and Paris district scale at which I was able to analyze
change over the period, we found no more than a few cases of intense concen-
tration of immigrants. It will be recalled that in no municipality in 1999 did
non-European immigrant residents (including second generation living with
immigrant parents) account for over 50% of the resident population. At the
TRIRIS scale in 1999, less than 5% of all immigrants lived in units where
they represented the majority. At the IRIS scale, I could only estimate that
proportion by excess: at the very most, 20% of all immigrants lived in units
where they represented the majority. Regardless of scale, then, heavy concen-
trations of immigrant residents represent no more than a small minority of
residential situations in the greater Paris metropolitan area. Clearly it is a
mistake to affirm, as is currently done in France, that immigrants, even
non-European ones, are living in “immigrant ghettos”: to do so is to project
onto an entire population a situation that, proportionally, quite seldom occurs.
The notion of ghetto applies well to American cities characterized by an
extremely high Black/White dissimilarity index, indicating that the vast
majority of each group is residentially separated from the other: 80% of
Blacks living in New York would have to move in order for Blacks to be
distributed as Whites at the census tract scale. But the term cannot be accu-
rately applied to the situation in the greater Paris metropolitan area, where, at
the same scale, only 40% of immigrants from North Africa or sub-Saharan
Africa would have to move to produce a distribution similar to that for French
persons born in mainland France. The majority of Blacks living in New York
live in neighborhoods where Blacks constitute the majority, whereas in Paris
this is true for only a small minority of immigrants. As Wacquant put it
(2006: 170), it would be a “sociological misinterpretation” to use the “ghetto”
notion as a model for conceiving the overall socio-spatial structure in France.
My results also invalidate a classic explanation for immigrant segregation,
inherited from the Chicago School, whereby segregation intensity is linked to
how recently the immigrant group in question arrived. France’s Portuguese
immigrants arrived no earlier than the country’s North African immigrants,
yet they are much less intensely segregated; Algerians immigrated to France
earlier than Moroccans, yet they show a slightly higher level of segregation.
Segregation is also often explained in socio-economic terms: immigrants
are segregated because they belong to unskilled occupational categories, runs
this argument; they therefore have lower incomes and are not as well inte-
grated as others in the labor market. If we compare 1999 segregation indexes
for socio-occupational categories to those for immigrant groups,(37) we see
that the latter for immigrants from North Africa and sub-Saharan Africa are
more than 20% higher than for unskilled industrial workers and more than
(37) At the same scale and for the same geographical frame. The segregation index is the dissi-
milarity index estimated for a reference group defined as the entire given population.
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50% higher than for semi-skilled industrial workers, the two most highly
segregated socio-occupational categories. While much immigrant segregation
is surely due to immigrants’ social class situation,(38) the breadth of the
observed gap can only bolster up the hypothesis that these immigrants are
discriminated against on ethno-racial grounds. Here the case of French
persons born in the DOM-TOMs is particularly striking. The segregation
index for this category, calculated under the same conditions, is 0.238; that is,
higher than the index for unskilled industrial workers, whereas in 1999, only
16.6% of these French citizens were manual workers while 39.8% were white
collar workers and 13% were working in mid-level occupations—more than
half, then, were working in two of the least segregated major socio-occupa-
tional categories (indices below 0.150).
However, while my results bolster up the ethno-racial discrimination
explanation they do not suffice to validate it. Immigrants in a given
socio-occupational category may be more or less skilled, have more or less
linguistic, cultural and other resources, and thus find themselves more or less
occupationally disadvantaged relative to more or less recent immigrants and
non-immigrants. Moreover, if we consider Waldinger’s path-dependency
interpretation for the US—namely that recent immigrants only get jobs of the
type available at the time they arrive; i.e., jobs that do little to skill them, and
that their employment careers are persistently affected by the economic situa-
tion at the moment they arrive on the labor market (Waldinger 1996;
Waldinger and Bozorgmehr 1996)—relevant for France, then immigrants to
France may also be at a disadvantage for having arrived relatively recently on
the job market. Likewise, relatively recent immigrant group arrival may help
explain higher group unemployment rates: “last in, first out.” Statistical study
of segregation cannot answer this question for France, since the census does
not include variables that would allow for describing ethno-racial groups in
finer socio-occupational detail. To answer this question—one that is assuming
importance in more general debates on social stratification and inequality
trends—we would need to consult more detailed surveys (that then could not
be directly related to the spatial distribution aspect).
In any case, the wide gaps I have indicated work in favor of the hypothesis
of an ethno-racial discrimination effect, which is then added on to the
inequalities just mentioned. But as specified in the introduction, this effect
may itself operate in various ways: discrimination at work or in access to
employment indirectly affects residential situation, whereas discrimination in
access to housing directly affects it.
Once again, if we want to determine the respective weights of the various
effects, we must have detailed analyses of the processes by which the
inequalities and discrimination affecting immigrants are constructed. Such
analyses, quantitative but above all qualitative, have been published in
several studies of poor neighborhoods in France. However, my results here
contrast with the implicit or explicit suggestion in those studies that the
56
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(38) I analyze this point in detail in an article in progress.
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majority of non-European immigrants, particularly young people of the
second generation, are living in “neighborhoods of exile.” The analyses
presented here show, on the contrary, that while situations of heavy residen-
tial concentration do exist and cannot be considered insignificant given the
intensity of the difficulties that develop in them, they concern only a small
minority of immigrants—just as I showed earlier (Préteceille 2006a) that
while the socio-economic situation in some poorer neighborhoods has
gotten significantly worse and that this cannot be neglected, only a minority
of neighborhoods are implicated in that phenomenon.
For a French reader, the list of municipalities that do show a relatively high
level of segregation seems to evoke the list of neighborhoods most directly impli-
cated in the 2005 riots (Lagrange 2006). It would be interesting to check this
more systematically by comparing the map of neighborhoods involved in the
riots with the map of TRIRISes showing the highest immigrant concentrations. If
that correspondence were to be observed, this would reinforce Lagrange and
Oberti’s hypothesis (2006) that situations of particularly intense segregation had
an effect of their own on the broader social tensions that led to those riots.
However, it seems to me that by focusing too exclusively on extreme situa-
tions of that sort, we render predominant situations invisible and make immi-
grant segregation seem like relegation to ghetto neighborhoods, when in fact
most immigrants in France experience a more moderate, relative type of
segregration—discrimination from non-immigrants within mixed neighbor-
hoods in which they are a minority. It is this moderate yet very real type of
segregation, more intense than socio-economic segregation (i.e., the type that
is recognized as excessive in French public debate) that is the predominant
phenomenon, though once again, it is masked by the fact that we focus almost
exclusively on extreme situations.
Overemphasizing extremes also leads to interpreting the effects of immi-
grant segregation primarily in terms of separation and a “break in the social
tie,” a break symmetrically imputed either to the dominant group’s refusal to
integrate immigrants or to immigrants’ refusal to become integrated. In fact,
analysis of what I have shown to be moderate segregation that nonetheless
affects urban Paris area society as a whole should move us to reflect on the
urban inequalities affecting most immigrants to varying degrees and the close
interaction between those inequalities and socio-economic ones, as well as
relations between immigrants and non-immigrants by urban context, by varia-
tion in weight of the various groups, by local socio-economic structure(s),
living conditions and quality of public services, and by local policy practices.
Emphasizing extreme situations that apply only to a minority of immigrants
means neglecting the moderate but nonetheless real difficulties of the majority of
immigrants and the problems those difficulties cause for their social integration.
Those problems may be less intense and spectacular than the ones characterizing
extreme situations, yet they remain obstacles to social cohesion and they affect
everything from relations among neighboring social groups within a district,
neighborhood or the workplace to relations between those groups and
57
Edmond PRÉTECEILLE
D
oc
um
en
t t
él
éc
ha
rg
é 
de
pu
is 
ww
w.
ca
irn
.in
fo
 - 
In
st
itu
t d
'E
tu
de
s 
Po
liti
qu
es
 d
e 
Pa
ris
 - 
  -
 1
93
.5
4.
67
.9
4 
- 0
3/
11
/2
01
4 
17
h2
5.
 ©
 P
re
ss
es
 d
e 
Sc
ie
nc
es
 P
o 
D
ocum
ent téléchargé depuis www.cairn.info - Institut d'Etudes Politiques de Paris -   - 193.54.67.94 - 03/11/2014 17h25. © Presses de Sciences Po 
institutions—all relations likely to be eroded by moderate but widespread
discriminatory decisions or acts and the feelings of injustice they slowly but
ineluctably generate. It is surely the shared experience of segregation and
ethno-racial discrimination (despite the fact that that experience varies in inten-
sity by immigrant group and individual), especially when it comes to access to
employment and relations with the public authorities, including the police, that
led a majority of immigrants and their children to share the frustration of the
rioters of 2005 and to understand their rage,(39) when in fact the vast majority of
those immigrants do not live in particularly difficult neighborhoods themselves.
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APPENDIX
TABLE A-I. – Population of Île-de-France by National Origin and Place of Birth
Origins 1982 1990 1999
Born French in mainland France 7,829,260 8,196,012 8,361,769
Born French outside France 390,084 398,251 353,332
Born French in the DOM-TOMs 173,588 198,483 191,116
Acquired French nationality and foreign-born-in-France 342,192 378,547 432,930
United States, Canada, New Zealand, Australia 14,160 19,036 21,872
Northern Europe 79,828 85,851 85,614
Italy 121,372 112,554 107,173
Spain 101,204 86,353 69,358
Portugal 97,824 81,143 62,796
Algeria 274,628 267,952 258,006
Tunisia 209,096 204,229 215,371
Middle East 78,220 82,966 82,474
India, Pakistan, etc. 107,040 135,669 163,882
East and Southeast Asia 84,680 135,278 205,256
Latin America 21,256 40,198 49,065
Others 30,672 48,840 52,278
Total 16,160 42,520 60,972
Total number of immigrants 77,532 109,883 132,753
Born French in mainland France 21,096 34,544 44,534
Born French outside France 1,176 1,766 585
Total 10,071,068 10,660,075 10,951,136
Total immigrants 1,335,944 1,488,782 1,611,989
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(39) According to a 2006 Pew Institute survey, 63% of the French Muslims questioned said
they felt sympathy for the rioters (Pew Research Center 2006: 13).
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Figure A-1 shows dissimilarity index variation for immigrant groups as a
function of average spatial unit size studied.(40) Three index levels are clearly
visible: approximately the same for European immigrants; much higher for
North African and sub-Saharan immigrants (the ratio between the two is
fairly constant: 1.7, regardless of spatial unit size), and an even higher one for
immigrants from Turkey. Index increase by size is non-linear (except perhaps
for the Portuguese and sub-Saharan groups); the index rises approximately
12% when we move from the municipality to the TRIRIS scale and another
13% from the TRIRIS to the IRIS scale. Only Turkish immigrants show a
dissimilarity index anything like the index for Blacks (and at much lower
numbers) in relatively integrated, small American cities (e.g., San Diego,
California, where the index is 0.54, and Austin, Texas, 0.52).
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FIGURE A-1. – Dissimilarity Indexes for Immigrant Groups in 1999 and
Average Size of Spatial Units (IRISes, TRIRISes, Municipalities)
(40) For the IRIS-related estimates, the
reference population—French persons born
French—is underestimated relative to the
others. However, the geographic frame is consi-
derably larger, including many more peripheral
metropolitan spaces, and this works to increase
the index (see above). The hypothesis here is
that these two effects cancel each other out.
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Figure A-2 indicates isolation index variation for the different immigrant
groups by average spatial unit size. There are two main modalities: weak vari-
ation in the Italian and Spanish groups; strong variation—four times as
strong—in the Algerian, Moroccan and sub-Saharan groups. Due to its size,
the Portuguese immigrant group is in the strong variation set, though the
dissimilarity index shows them to be much less segregated than immigrants
from North Africa. Conversely, the isolation index for Tunisian immigrants,
whose numbers are much lower, falls between the two modalities, as does the
index for Turkish immigrants. The rise in isolation index with spatial unit size
is sharper than for the dissimilarity index.
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FIGURE A-2. – Isolation Indexes of Immigrant Groups in 1999 and Average
Spatial Unit Size (IRISes, TRIRISes, Municipalities)
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